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EXPLICIT MATHEMATICS AND OPERATIONAL SET THEORY: SOME
ONTOLOGICAL COMPARISONS
GERHARD JA¨GER AND RICO ZUMBRUNNEN
Abstract. We discuss several ontological properties of explicit mathematics and opera-
tional set theory: global choice, decidable classes, totality and extensionality of operations,
function spaces, class and set formation via formulas that contain the deﬁnedness predicate
and applications.
§1. Introduction. The purpose of this article is to discuss several ontolog-
ical properties of explicit mathematics and operational set theory, not least
of all for the sake of pointing out some principal diﬀerences between explicit
mathematics and operational set theory. Very often, operational set theory
is regarded as the set-theoretic counterpart of explicit mathematics, and this
point of view is certainly justiﬁed – but only to a certain extent.
Both explicit mathematics and operational set theory give operations a
prominent role, self-application is possible though not necessarily deﬁned.
And in both cases the universe of discourse is a partial combinatory algebra.
However, diﬀerences occur, for example, with respect to global choice, the
possibility of asking for totality and extensionality of operations, and set or
class formation by means of formulas that contain the deﬁnedness predicate
and applications.
In the following section we brieﬂy introduce the formalism of explicit
mathematics, review several of its known ontological properties and turn
to some additional ones that have not yet been published in this form.
Interesting observations tell us that choice is problematic and decidability
of classes can only be permitted for “small” classes.
Afterwards we turn to operational set theory and show that it is not
consistent to claim that all operations are total or extensional and that the
collection of all operations from a set a to a set b do not form a set in all
relevant cases. We also analyze the situation of set formation via formulas
that permit the deﬁnedness predicate and application terms and point out a
signiﬁcant diﬀerence between uniform and nonuniform such set formations.
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§2. Explicit mathematics. Explicit mathematics and in particular the
axiomatic system T0 – then formulated in intuitionistic logic – were intro-
duced by Feferman in the nineteen seventies and originally designed as a
framework for formalizing Bishop-style constructive mathematics. But soon
it became evident that systems of explicit mathematics (based on intuition-
istic or classical logic) play an independent important role in proof theory.
The three articles Feferman [7, 8, 9] provide an excellent introduction into
explicit mathematics and put it into a general context.
Here we do not work with Feferman’s original formalization of systems of
explicitmathematics; insteadwe treat them as theories of types and names as
developed in Ja¨ger [14] and used in, for example, Ja¨ger and Strahm [20, 21]
and Ja¨ger and Studer [22]. The following description of the relevant systems
of explicit mathematics is more or less as in [21].
The applicative theory with elementary typing (AET) that we will con-
sider is formulated in the second order language L for individuals and types.
It comprises individual variables a, b, c, f, g, h, u, v, w, x, y, z, . . . as well as
type variables U,V,W,X,Y,Z, . . . (both possibly with subscripts). L also
includes the individual constants k, s (combinators), p, p0, p1 (pairing and
projections), 0 (zero), sN (successor), pN (predecessor), dN (deﬁnition by
numerical cases), and additional individual constants that will be used for
the uniform naming of types, namely nat (natural numbers), id (identity),
co (complement), un (union), dom (domain), and inv (inverse image). There
is one binary function symbol · for (partial) application of individuals to
individuals. Further, L has unary relation symbols ↓ (deﬁned), N (natu-
ral numbers), as well as three binary relation symbols ∈ (membership), =
(equality), and  (naming, representation).
The individual terms (r, s, t, r1, s1, t1, . . .) of L are built up from individual
variables and individual constants by means of our function symbol · for
forming applications (s ·t). In the following we often abbreviate (s ·t) as (st)
or – if no confusion arises – simply as st. We further adopt the convention
of association to the left so that s1s2 . . . sn stands for (. . . (s1 · s2) . . . sn), and
we often also write s(t1, . . . , tn) for st1 . . . tn. Further notations:
<s, t> := ps1s2, t′ := sNt, and 1 := 0′.
The atomic formulas of L are the expressions N(s), s↓, (s = t), (U = V ),
(s ∈ U ), and (s,U ); the formulas (A,B,C,A1, B1, C1, . . .) of L are gen-
erated from the atomic formulas by closing under negation, disjunction,
conjunction, implication, equivalence, as well as existential and universal
quantiﬁcation for individuals and types. The free variables of t and A are
deﬁned in the standard way; the closed L terms and closed L formulas, also
called L sentences, are those that do not contain free variables.
Since we work with a logic of partial terms, it is not guaranteed that all
terms have values, and s↓ is read as s is defined or s has a value. Moreover,
N(s) says that s is a natural number, and the formula (s,U ) is used to
express that the individual s represents the type U or is a name of U .
We often omit parentheses and brackets whenever there is no danger
of confusion. Moreover, we frequently make use of the vector notation
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U and s for ﬁnite strings of type variables U1, . . . , Um and individual terms
s1, . . . , sn, respectively,whose length is not important or givenby the context.
Suppose now that a = a1, . . . , an and s = s1, . . . , sn. Then A[s/a ] is
the L formula that is obtained from the L formula A by simultaneously
replacing all free occurrences of the variables a by the terms s ; in order to
avoid collision of variables, a renaming of bound variablesmay be necessary.
If the L formula A is written as B[a ], then we often simply write B[s ]
instead of A[s/a ]. Further variants of this notation below will be obvious.
The substitution of L terms for variables in L terms is treated accordingly.
The following table contains a list of useful abbreviations:
(s = t) := ¬(s = t),
(s  t) := s↓ ∨ t↓ → s = t,
(s ∈ N) := N(s),
(V ⊆W ) := ∀x(x ∈ V → x ∈W ),
(s ∈˙ t) := ∃X ((t, X ) ∧ s ∈ X ),
(s) := ∃X(s, X ),
(r, U ) := (r1, U1) ∧ . . . ∧ (rn, Un),
where the vector r consists of the individual terms r1, . . . , rn and the vector
U of the type variables U1, . . . , Un.
The underlying logic of AET is given by Beeson’s classical logic of partial
terms (cf. Beeson [2] or Troelstra and vanDalen [25]) for the individuals and
classical logic with equality for the types.We also include the usual strictness
axioms. The nonlogical axioms of AET can be divided into the following
groups:
I. Applicative axioms. These axioms formalize that the individuals form a
partial combinatory algebra, that we have pairing and projection and the
usual closure conditions on the natural numbers plus deﬁnition by numerical
cases.
(1) kab = a,
(2) sab↓ ∧ sabc  (ac)(bc),
(3) p0(<a, b>) = a ∧ p1(<a, b>) = b,
(4) 0 ∈ N,
(5) a ∈ N → a′ ∈ N,
(6) a ∈ N → a′ = 0 ∧ pN(a′) = a,
(7) a ∈ N ∧ a = 0 → pNa ∈ N ∧ (pNa)′ = a,
(8) a ∈ N ∧ b ∈ N ∧ a = b → dN(x, y, a, b) = x,
(9) a ∈ N ∧ b ∈ N ∧ a = b → dN(x, y, a, b) = y.
II. Explicit representation and extensionality. The following axioms state
that each type has a name, that there are no homonyms and that equality of
types is extensional.
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(1) ∃x(x,U ),
(2) (a,U ) ∧ (a,V ) → U = V ,
(3) ∀x(x ∈ U ↔ x ∈ V ) → U = V .
III. Basic type existence axioms. In the following we provide a ﬁnite
axiomatization of uniform elementary comprehension.
Natural numbers
(1) (nat) ∧ ∀x(x ∈˙ nat ↔ N(x)).
Identity
(2) (id) ∧ ∀x(x ∈˙ id ↔ ∃y(x = <y, y>)).
Complements
(3) (a) → (co(a)) ∧ ∀x(x ∈˙ co(a) ↔ x ˙∈ a).
Unions
(4) (a) ∧ (b) → (un(a, b)) ∧ ∀x(x ∈˙ un(a, b) ↔ x ∈˙ a ∨ x ∈˙ b).
Domains
(5) (a) → (dom(a)) ∧ ∀x(x ∈˙ dom(a) ↔ ∃y(<x, y> ∈˙ a)).
Inverse images
(6) (a) → (inv(a, f)) ∧ ∀x(x ∈˙ inv(a, f) ↔ fx ∈˙ a).
As usual from the axioms of a partial combinatory algebra, i.e., from the
applicative axioms (1) and (2) above, we can introduce for each L term t an
L term (x.t) whose variables are those of t other than x such that
(x.t)↓ ∧ (x.t)y  t[y/x].
Of course, we can generalize  abstraction to several arguments by simply
iterating abstraction for one argument. Accordingly, we set for all L terms t
and all variables x1, . . . , xn,
(x1 . . . xn.t) := (x1.(. . . (xn.t) . . .)).
Often the term (x1 . . . xn.t) is simply written as x1 . . . xn.t. If x is the
sequence x1, . . . , xn, then x.t stands for x1 . . . xn.t.
The applicative axioms (1) and (2) also provide us with a closed L term
fix – a so-called ﬁxed point operator – such that
fix(f)↓ ∧ fix(f, x)  f(fix(f), x).
If an L formula A is called elementary provided that it contains neither the
relation symbol  nor bound type variables, then we have the following
result; see Feferman and Ja¨ger [12].
Theorem 2.1. For every elementary formula A[u, v, W ] with at most the
indicated free variables there exists a closed term tA such that AET proves:
1. (w, W ) → (tA(v, w)),
2. (w, W ) → ∀x(x ∈˙ tA(v, w) ↔ A[x, v, W ]).
A trivial consequence of this theorem is that there exist the type V of all
objects (the universal type) and the type of the natural numbers, denoted
by N as the corresponding relation symbol.
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Our theory AET is a subsystem of the theory EET, which has been con-
sidered in, for example, Feferman and Ja¨ger [12]. EET comprises additional
axioms for primitive recursion, but they are of no relevance for the follow-
ing ontological considerations. However, before turning to some new results,
let me recall some well-known inconsistencies. By Feferman [7] and some
straightforward considerations we know that AET is inconsistent with:
• the totality statement ∀x∀y(xy↓) plus full deﬁnition by cases.
• the totality statement ∀x∀y(xy↓) plus ∀xN(x).
• extensionality of operations plus full deﬁnition by cases.
• extensionality of operations plus ∀xN(x).
Furthermore, in Feferman [7], it is also shown that AET is inconsistent with
the schema of comprehension for arbitrary L formulas, and Ja¨ger [15] tells
us that the names of a type never form a type.
2.1. Global and weak choice. The axioms of operational set theory (OST)
comprise an axiom for global choice, and we will show in this section that
the corresponding statement is inconsistent with explicit mathematics. In
order to prove this, we ﬁrst turn to (names of) types that represent graphs
of functions in the set-theoretic sense and ask the question whether such
graphs can be represented in an operational sense.
Definition 2.2.
1. G[a] :=
{
(a) ∧ (∀x ∈˙ a)(x = <p0x, p1x>) ∧
(∀x, y ∈˙ a)(p0x = p0y → p1x = p1y).
2. O[a, f] := G[a] ∧ (∀x ∈˙ a)(f(p0x) = p1x).
The formula G[a] says that a is the name of a type that represents the graph
of a function. On the other hand,O[a, f] means that a represents the graph
of a function and f is an operation that yields the same values as this
function.
Theorem 2.3. In AET not every graph of a set-theoretic function can be
simulated by an operation; i.e.,
AET  ∃a(G[a] ∧ ∀f¬O[a, f]).
Proof. We work in AET and let A[u] be the elementary L formula
(u = <p0u, 0> ∧ (p0u)(p0u) = 1) ∨ (u = <p0u, 1> ∧ (p0u)(p0u) = 1).
Thus Theorem 2.1 implies that there exists the name a of a type such that
(∀x ∈˙ a)(x = <p0x, p1x>) and for all individuals u and v,
<u, v> ∈˙ a ↔ (uu = 1 ∧ v = 0) ∨ (uu = 1 ∧ v = 1).
Clearly, we have G[a]. Now assume that there exists an f such that O[a, f].
Then we have
∀x∀y(<x, y> ∈˙ a → fx = y).
Altogether we thus have (ff = 1 ↔ ff = 1), a contradiction. Hence
there is no f with O[a, f], and our theorem is proved. 
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Making use of this theorem we can easily derive that explicit mathematics
does not permit a form of global choice as in operational set theory. Actually,
even a very weak form of global choice will be seen to be inconsistent
with AET.
Definition 2.4.
1. C[f] := ∀x((x) ∧ ∃y(y ∈˙ x) → fx ∈˙ x).
2. C1[f] := ∀x(∃y∀z(z ∈˙ x ↔ z = y) → fx ∈˙ x).
Hence C[f] formalizes that f is a global operation picking from any
nonempty type an element; C1[f] is a weak version of global choice claim-
ing only that f selects the uniquely determined element of every type that
contains exactly one element. It is obvious that C[f] implies C1[f].
Theorem 2.5. AET is inconsistent with the statement that there exists a
weak global choice operation, i.e.,
AET  ¬∃fC1[f].
Proof. We work within AET, pick the formula A[u] introduced in the
proof of the previous theorem, let a be the name of the type deﬁned byA[u],
and recall from the proof of the previous theorem that
∀f¬O[a, f]. (*)
We also set B[u, v,W ] := (<v, u> ∈ W ) and assume C1[g] for some indi-
vidual g. First observe that Theorem 2.1 provides us with a closed L term
tB such that
(b) → ((tB (x, b)) ∧ ∀y(y ∈˙ tB(x, b) ↔ <x, y> ∈˙ b)).
Since a is a name, this implies that
y ∈˙ tB (x, a) ↔ ((y = 0 ∧ xx = 1) ∨ (y = 1 ∧ xx = 1)).
It only remains to deﬁne s := ux.g(tB(x, u)). Then sa↓ and, because of
C1[g], we also have
(xx = 1 → s(a, x) = 0) ∧ (xx = 1 → s(a, x) = 1),
meaning that O[a, sa]. This is a contradiction to (*), and thus there cannot
exist a g with C1[g]. 
Corollary 2.6. AET is inconsistent with the existence of a global choice
operation, i.e.,
AET  ¬∃fC[f].
Please keep inmind that these forms of weak global choice and global choice
must not be confused with other forms of choice such as
∀x∃yA[x, y] → ∃f∀xA[x,fx], (AC)
where A[u, v] may be any L formula. However, by taking up the argument
in Feferman [9], one can easily see that AET+ (AC) is inconsistent as well.
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2.2. Decidable and semidecidable types. In explicit mathematics we call
a subtype W of a type V decidable on V if and only if there exists an
operation that is total on V and yields 0 for all elements ofW and 1 for all
elements of V not inW . Accordingly, a subtypeW of a type V is denoted
as semidecidable onV if and only if there exists an operation f such that for
all elements x of V we have fx = 0 exactly for the elements ofW .
Definition 2.7.
1. T [V,f] := (∀x ∈ V )(fx = 0 ∨ fx = 1).
2. D[V,W ] :=W ⊆ V ∧∃f(T [V,f] ∧ (∀x ∈ V )(fx = 0 ↔ x ∈ W )).
3. SD[V,W ] := W ⊆ V ∧ ∃f(∀x ∈ V )(fx = 0 ↔ x ∈W ).
In addition, we write D[W ] and SD[W ] for D[V,W ] and SD[V,W ],
respectively.
InAETor stronger systems likeT0 we cannot prove that a typeU is decidable
if and only if U and the complement of U are semidecidable. On the other
hand, it seems that we can consistently add such a statement in all relevant
cases. What is not allowed is to assume that all types are semidecidable.
Theorem 2.8. AET is inconsistent with the statement that all types are
semidecidable, i.e.,
AET  ¬∀XSD[X ].
Proof. Working informally in AET, use Theorem 2.1 to introduce the
type U for which
∀x(x ∈ U ↔ xx = 0).
Hence if ∀XSD[X ] is assumed we have an operation f such that
∀x(fx = 0 ↔ x ∈ U ).
This implies (ff = 0 ↔ ff = 0), a contradiction. 
While it is inconsistent to assume that every type is semidecidable on the uni-
verse, we may consistently claim that every subtype of the natural numbers
is even decidable on the naturals. To see why, consider the level V+ in the
cumulative hierarchy and construct the full set-theoretic model as described
in Feferman [9]. Then every set-theoretic function belonging to V+ – and
thus every set of natural numbers – is represented by an operation.
Theorem 2.9. The theory AET+ (∀X ⊆ N)D[N, X ] is consistent.
It is an easy exercise to extend this theorem to AET+(∀X ⊆ U )D[U,X ] for
all types U that are bounded in the sense of Feferman [7, 9].
A ﬁrst approach to dealing with “ordinary” set theory in explicit mathe-
matics is to interpret sets as (names of) types. However, as shown in Ja¨ger
[15], it is inconsistent with AET that the names of the empty type form a
type and, consequently, that the strong form of the power types axiom
∀X∃Y∀z(z ∈ Y ↔ (∃Z ⊆ X )(z, Z)) (S-Pow)
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is inconsistent with AET as well. The situation is diﬀerent if we only require
that for every type X there exists a type Y that consists of names of all
subtypes of X ,
∀X∃Y ((∀z ∈ Y )(∃Z ⊆ X )(z, Z) ∧ (∀Z ⊆ X )(∃z ∈ Y )(z, Z)).
(W-Pow)
According to Feferman [9], this weak power type axiom is consistent with
AET. From the proof there we can even conclude that the uniform version of
(W-Pow) is consistent with AET (and many extensions of AET), but recall
from [9] that inconsistencies arise as soon as the join axiom, which allows
the formation of disjoint unions of families of types, is added. Also, the
weak power type axiom is not really in the spirit of explicit mathematics
since the selection of the names of the subtypes that go into the power type
is not made explicit.
Because of these complications in dealing with power types, the interpre-
tation of sets as (names of) types does not lead to a satisfactory treatment of
set theory within explicit mathematics. Of course, such complications vanish
in operational set theory.
§3. Operational set theory. Feferman’s original motivation for opera-
tional set theory was to provide a setting for the operational formulation of
large cardinal statements directly over set theory in a way that seemed to him
to be more natural mathematically than the metamathematical formulations
using reﬂection and indescribability principles, etc. He saw operational set
theory as a natural extension of the vonNeumann approach to axiomatizing
set theory.†
The system OST has been introduced in Feferman [10] and further dis-
cussed in Feferman [11] and Ja¨ger [16, 17, 18, 19]. For a ﬁrst discussion of
operational set theory and some generalmotivationwe refer to these articles,
in particular to [11].
Besson [3] presents rule based extensions of set theory and in this sense
there is some similarity to operational set theory, though starting oﬀ from
a diﬀerent motivation. Also, his main system ZFR is conservative over
Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory and thus signiﬁcantly stronger thanOST. Can-
tini and Crosilla [5,6] and Cantini [4] are about the interplay between some
constructive variants of operational set theory and constructive set theory.
In the next paragraphs we present the syntax of operational set theory,
though not in its original form (as in the articles mentioned above) but in a
slightlymodiﬁed and essentially equivalent way similar to Zumbrunnen [27].
LetLbe a typical language of ﬁrst order set theorywith the binary symbols
∈ and = as its only relation symbols and countably many set variables
a, b, c, f, g, u, v, w, x, y, z, . . . (possibly with subscripts). We further assume
thatL has a constant for the collection of all ﬁnite vonNeumann ordinals.
The formulas of L are deﬁned as usual.
†Another principal motivation of Feferman [10,11] was to relate formulations of classical
large cardinal statements to their analogues in admissible set theory. However, in view of
Ja¨ger and Zumbrunnen [23] this aim of OST has to be analyzed further.
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The language L◦ of operational set theory extends L by the binary func-
tion symbol ◦ for partial term application, the unary relation symbol ↓
for deﬁnedness and a series of constants: (i) the combinators k and s,
(ii) ,⊥, el, non, dis, and e for logical operations, (iii) D, U, S, R, and C for
set-theoretic operations. The meaning of these constants will be speciﬁed by
the axioms below.
As in explicit mathematics, the terms (r, s, t, r1, s1, t1, . . .) of L◦ are built
up from the variables and constants, now by means of our function symbol
◦ for application to form expressions (s ◦ t). Taking up the conventions
of explicit mathematics, (s ◦ t) is often abbreviated as st or simply as st,
again association to the left is made use of so that s1s2 . . . sn stands for
(. . . (s1 ◦ s2) . . . sn), and frequently we write s(t1, . . . , tn) for st1 . . . tn.
The formulas (A,B,C,D,A1, B1, C1, D1, . . .) of L◦ are inductively gener-
ated as follows:
1. All expressions of the form (s ∈ t), (s = t), and (t↓) are formulas of
L◦, the so-called atomic formulas.
2. If A and B are formulas of L◦ , then so are ¬A, (A ∨ B), (A ∧ B),
(A→ B), and (A↔ B).
3. If A is a formula of L◦ and if t is a term of L◦ which does not contain
x, then (∃x ∈ t)A, (∀x ∈ t)A, ∃xA, and ∀xA are formulas of L◦.
The notions of free variables, A[s/a], and B[s] are as in L, and we often
omit parentheses and brackets whenever there is no danger of confusion.
The negation (s = t) of (s = t) and the partial equality (s  t) are deﬁned
as above.
To increase readability, we freely use standard set-theoretic terminology.
For example, ifA[x] is anL◦ formula, then {x : A[x]} denotes the collection
of all sets satisfying A; it may be (extensionally equal to) a set, but this is
not necessarily the case. Special cases are
V := {x : x↓}, ∅ := {x : x = x}, and B := {x : x =  ∨ x = ⊥}
so that V, as in explicit mathematics, denotes the collection of all sets (it is
not a set itself), ∅ stands for the empty collection, and B for the unordered
pair consisting of the truth values and ⊥ (it will turn out that ∅ and B are
sets in OST). The following shorthand notation, for n an arbitrary natural
number greater than 0,
(f : an → b) := (∀x1, . . . , xn ∈ a)(f(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ b)
expresses that f, in the operational sense, is an n-ary mapping from a to b.
It does not say, however, thatf is an n-ary function in the set-theoretic sense.
In this deﬁnition the set variablesa and bmaybe replaced byV andB. So, for
example, (f : a → V) means that f is total on a, and (f : V → b) means
that f maps all sets into b.
As in the case of explicit mathematics, also the logic of operational set the-
ory is Beeson’s classical logic of partial terms with strictness, including the
common equality axioms. The nonlogical axioms of OST comprise axioms
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about the applicative structure of the universe, some basic set-theoretic prop-
erties, the representation of elementary logical connectives as operations,
and operational set existence axioms.
I. Applicative axioms.
(A1) kxy = x,
(A2) sxy↓ ∧ sxyz  (xz)(yz).
II. Basic set-theoretic axioms. They comprise: (i) the usual extensionality
axiom; (ii) assertions that give the appropriate meaning to the constant ;
(iii) ∈-induction for arbitrary formulas A[u] of L◦,
∀x((∀y ∈ x)A[y]→ A[x]) → ∀xA[x].
III. Logical operations axioms.
(L1)  = ⊥,
(L2) (el : V2 → B) ∧ ∀x∀y(el(x, y) =  ↔ x ∈ y),
(L3) (non : B→ B) ∧ (∀x ∈ B)(non(x) =  ↔ x = ⊥),
(L4) (dis : B2 → B) ∧ (∀x, y ∈ B)(dis(x, y) =  ↔ (x =  ∨ y = )),
(L5) (f : a → B) → (e(f, a) ∈ B ∧ (e(f, a) =  ↔ (∃x ∈ a)(fx = ))).
IV. Set-theoretic operations axioms.
(S1) Unordered pair:
D(a, b)↓ ∧ ∀x(x ∈ D(a, b) ↔ x = a ∨ x = b).
(S2) Union:
U(a)↓ ∧ ∀x(x ∈ U(a) ↔ (∃y ∈ a)(x ∈ y)).
(S3) Separation for deﬁnite operations:
(f : a → B) → (S(f, a)↓ ∧ ∀x(x ∈ S(f, a) ↔ (x ∈ a ∧ fx = ))).
(S4) Replacement:
(f : a → V) → (R(f, a)↓ ∧ ∀x(x ∈ R(f, a) ↔ (∃y ∈ a)(x=fy))).
(S5) Choice:
∃x(fx = ) → (Cf↓ ∧ f(Cf) = ).
This ﬁnishes our description of the system OST. It is known from Feferman
[10,11] and Ja¨ger [16] that OST is proof-theoretically equivalent to Kripke–
Platek set theory with inﬁnity. A recent result of Sato and Zumbrunnen even
shows thatOSTwithout the choice axiom (S5) is of the same proof-theoretic
strength asKripke–Platek set theory with inﬁnity; cf. also Zumbrunnen [27].
According to the applicative axioms the universe is a partial combinatory
algebra, and thus we have  abstraction and a ﬁxed point operator fix exactly
as in explicit mathematics.
AlthoughOST itself does not include an axiom for power sets, operational
set theory – in contrast to explicitmathematics – provides an ideal framework
for introducing them. We simply select a new constant P and let OST(P) be
the extension of OST obtained by adding
(P : V→ V) ∧ ∀x∀y(y ∈ Px ↔ y ⊆ x)
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and formulating all axiomsofOST for the new language.Wewill not consider
this system further in the following.
3.1. Totality. A ﬁrst signiﬁcant diﬀerence between explicit mathematics
and operational set theory has to do with totality: AET and many exten-
sions such as T0 are consistent with the totality assumption ∀x∀y(xy↓). In
operational set theory this is not the case.
Theorem 3.1.
1. There exists a closed L◦ term t such that OST proves t↓ and ∀x¬(tx↓).
2. OST proves ¬∀x∀y(xy↓).
Proof. Let s be the term xy.D(xy, xy) and set t := fix(s). Then we have
t↓ and for any set u,
tu  s(t, u)  D(tu, tu)  {tu}.
Because of the wellfoundedness of the ∈ relation this is only possible if tu is
not deﬁned. Therefore, we have the ﬁrst assertion, and the second is an
immediate consequence. 
A next interesting distinction between explicit mathematics and operational
set theory has to do with totality checking. To show this, we make use of
the well-known term representation of Δ0 formulas and an extended form
of deﬁnition by Δ0 cases.
The Δ0 formulas of L◦ are deﬁned to be those L◦ formulas which do
not contain the function symbol ◦, the relation symbol ↓ or unbounded
quantiﬁers. Hence they are the Δ0 formulas of traditional set theory, possibly
containing additional constants. The logical operations make it possible to
represent all Δ0 formulas by constant L◦ terms. For a proof of the following
lemma see Feferman [10, 11].
Lemma 3.2. Let u be the sequence of variables u1, . . . , un. For every
Δ0 formula A[u] of L◦ with at most the variables u free, there exists a closed
L◦ term tA such that OST proves
tA↓ ∧ (tA : Vn → B) ∧ ∀x(A[x] ↔ tA(x) = ).
In combinationwith the axiom (S3) about separation for deﬁnite operations,
this lemma provides us with a uniform version of Δ0 separation.
Theorem 3.3. Let u be the sequence of variables u1, . . . , un. For every
Δ0 formula A[u, v] of L◦ with at most the variables u, v free, there exists a
closed L◦ term rpA such that OST proves
rpA↓ ∧ (rpA : Vn+1 → V) ∧ ∀x∀y(rpA(x, y) = {z ∈ y : A[x, z]}).
Please observe that the relation symbol ↓ and applications are not permitted
in the formulas A of the previous lemma and theorem. We will see later that
this restriction is crucial.
As shown in Zumbrunnen [26], the previous lemma can be extended to
deﬁnition by cases with respect to Δ0 formulas of L◦.
Lemma 3.4. Let u be the sequence of variables u1, . . . , un. For every Δ0
formula A[u] of L◦ with at most the variables u free, there exists a closed L◦
term sA such that OST proves:
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1. sA(u, v)↓ ∧ (sA(u, v) : Vn → D(u, v)).
2. (A[w] → sA(u, v, w) = u) ∧ (¬A[w] → sA(u, v, w) = v).
We may ask the question whether testing all operations for totality is
consistent with explicit mathematics and operational set theory.
Definition 3.5. We call an operation f a totality checker if and only if it
has the property T C[f], where
T C[f] := (f : V→ B) ∧ ∀x(fx =  ↔ ∀y(xy↓)).
The consistency of explicit mathematics with the existence of a totality
checker is a trivial consequence of the fact that explicit mathematics is
consistent with the assumption that all operations are total. The situation
in operational set theory is diﬀerent.
Theorem 3.6. OST is inconsistent with the existence of a totality checker,
i.e.,
OST  ¬∃fT C[f].
Proof.We work within OST and assume that there exists an f such that
T C[f]. Then consider the Δ0 formula A[u] := (u = ) and select the term
sA according to Lemma 3.4. Now set
r0 := xy.(sA(uv.D(uv, uv), uv.⊥, fx)xy)
and obtain ∀x∀y(r0(x, y)↓). More precisely, we have for all x and y that
r0(x, y) =
{
D(xy, xy) if fx = ,
⊥ if fx = ⊥. (1)
Finally, for r1 := fix(r0) and any a the properties of fix yield r1(a) r0(r1, a).
Since ∀x∀y(r0(x, y)↓) this even implies
r1(a) = r0(r1, a) and r1(a)↓ (2)
for all a. Hence f(r1) = , and (1) and (2) give us r1(a) = D(r1(a), r1(a))
for any a. As in the proof of Theorem 3.1 this is a contradiction. Hence a
totality checker cannot exist in OST. 
3.2. Function spaces and extensionality. Let U and V be types in explicit
mathematics, for example, in the theory AET. Then elementary compre-
hension implies the existence of types W1 and W2 with the following
properties:
(i) f ∈W1 ↔ ∀x(x ∈ U → fx ∈ V );
(ii) f ∈W2 ↔ ∀x(x ∈ U → fx ∈ V ) ∧ ∀x(x /∈ U → ¬(fx↓)).
Thismeans thatAET and explicitmathematics in general allow the formation
of (i) the type of all operations from a given U to a given V as well as the
formation of (ii) the type of all operations from a givenU to a givenV that
are undeﬁned outside U . Our next theorem tells us that a corresponding
result is false in operational set theory.
Theorem 3.7. The following three assertions are provable in OST:
1. If set a contains at least one element and set b contains at least two
elements, then {f : (f : a → b)} is not a set.
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2. If set a contains at least one element and set b contains at least two
elements, then the collection
{f : (f : a → b) ∧ ∀x(x /∈ a → ¬(fx↓))}
is not a set.
3. If set a contains at least one element and set b contains at least two
elements, then, for any set w, the collection
{f : (f : a → b) ∧ ∀x(x /∈ a → (fx = w))}
is not a set.
Proof. We conﬁne ourselves to proving the ﬁrst assertion; the proofs of
the second and third are obtained by suitable modiﬁcations and given in
Zumbrunnen [26]. So let a and b be sets inOST with an element a0 ∈ a and
two diﬀerent elements b1, b2 ∈ b. Also, assume that {f : (f : a → b)} is a
set c. For the Δ0 formula A[u, v] := (u = v) we ﬁrst pick the closed L◦ term
sA according to Lemma 3.4 and then deﬁne
r0 := fx.sA(b1, b2, fx, b2).
For all f ∈ c and x ∈ a we thus have r0(f, x) ∈ b and
r0(f, x) =
{
b1 if fx = b2,
b2 if fx = b2.
(1)
Now we take the Δ0 formula B[u, v] := (u ∈ v), select the closed L◦ term
sB according to Lemma 3.4 and deﬁne
r1 := gy.(sB(r0, fx.b1, g, c)gy).
In view of (1) it is easy to see that for any g and all y ∈ a,
r1(g, y) =
{
r0(g, y) if g ∈ c,
b1 if g ∈ c.
(2)
It only remains to set r2 := fix(r1). Consequently, r2(z)  r1(r2, z) for all z.
In particular, for z ∈ a the equations (1) and (2) yield r1(r2, z) ∈ b, thus
r2(z) ∈ b as well. This means that r2 ∈ c.
Finally, take the element a0 of a. Making use of (1) and (2) once more,
we derive the following sequence of equations,
r2(a0) = r1(r2, a0) = r0(r2, a0) =
{
b1 if r2(a0) = b2,
b2 if r2(a0) = b2.
Since b1 and b2 are diﬀerent, this is a contradiction.Hence {f : (f : a → b)}
cannot be a set in OST. 
A similar problem has been discussed in Cantini and Crosilla [5, 6]. There
Cantini and Crosilla study systems COST and EST of constructive oper-
ational set theory and mention that Minari observed the inconsistency of
EST plus the assertion
∀x∀y∃z(z = {f : (f : x → y)}).
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Their strategy of proof is diﬀerent. In these two articles, Cantini and Crosilla
also address the question of operational extensionality,
∀f∀g(∀x(fx  gx) → f = g) (EXT)
and show that (EXT) is inconsistent with their COST and EST. They argue
that for every total operation f in an extensional partial combinatory alge-
bra there exists an x such that fx = x and proved that this is not the case
in models of COST and EST. We obtain this as an immediate consequence
of our previous theorem.
Corollary 3.8. OST is inconsistent with (EXT), i.e.,
OST  ¬(EXT).
Proof. In OST we have the one-element set a := D(⊥,⊥) = {⊥} and the
two-element set b := D(⊥,) = {⊥,}; obviously, ⊥ is provably diﬀerent
from . Consider the L◦ terms
r0 := x.⊥ and r1 := x.sA(,⊥, x,⊥),
with A[u, v] := (u = v) and sA chosen according to Lemma 3.4. For any f
satisfying
(f : a → b) ∧ ∀x(x /∈ a → fx = ⊥)
we thus conclude
∀x(fx = r0(x)) ∨ ∀x(fx = r1(x)). (*)
Now assume (EXT). Then (*) yields
{f : (f : a → b) ∧ ∀x(x /∈ a → fx = ⊥)} = D(r0, r1).
Since D(r0, r1) is a set, this contradicts Theorem 3.7. Hence (EXT) has to be
false in OST. 
3.3. Separation with definedness and application. In view of Theorem 2.1
we know that in explicit mathematics all elementary L formulas A[u] can be
used to form the type U of all elements x satisfying A[x],
∀x(x ∈ U ↔ A[x]),
and elementary L formulas may contain the deﬁnedness relation ↓ as well as
application terms, i.e., terms of the form st. Hence in explicit mathematics
types canbe formedwith reference todeﬁnedness assertions and applications
of terms to each other.
In this section we will show that the situation is more intricate in the
case of operational set theory. In a nutshell: (i) From Theorem 3.3 we
know that uniform Δ0 separation can be proved in OST, but Δ0 formulas of
L◦ must not contain the deﬁnedness predicate and applications. (ii) Even
the simplest forms of uniform separation with deﬁnedness and application
lead to inconsistencies. (iii) The nonuniform versions of these separations are
consistentwithOST, but adding them toOST as further axioms increases the
proof-theoretic strength from that of Kripke–Platek set theory with inﬁnity
to that of Kripke–Platek set theory with inﬁnity and Σ1 separation.
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Theorem 3.9. OST is inconsistent with uniform comprehension (separa-
tion) for formulas involving definedness and application; in particular, we
have:
1. OST  ¬∃f∀x(fx↓ ∧ fx = {y ∈ x : yy↓}).
2. OST  ¬∃f∀x∀g(f(x, g)↓ ∧ f(x, g) = {y ∈ x : gy↓}).
Proof. Working in OST, we proceed indirectly for establishing the ﬁrst
assertion and assume that f is an operation that satisﬁes
∀x(fx↓ ∧ fx = {y ∈ x : yy↓}).
For the L◦ term r0 := x.f(D(x, x)) and any a we thus have
r0(a)↓ ∧ (r0(a) = ∅ ↔ aa↓). (*)
Now let A[u] be the Δ0 formula (u = ∅) and B[u] the Δ0 formula (u = ).
For A[u] we choose an L◦ term sA according to Lemma 3.4 and for B[u] an
L◦ term tB according to Lemma 3.2. Then we deﬁne
r1 := x.(sA(y.tB(yy), y.⊥, r0(x))x).
Given an arbitrary a, statement (*) yields r0(a)↓ and we conclude
r1(a) =
{
(y.tB(yy))a if r0(a) = ∅,
(y.⊥)a if r0(a) = ∅.
Together with (*), we thus obtain
r1(a) =
{
tB (aa) if aa↓,
⊥ if ¬(aa↓),
and because of the properties of tB this implies
r1(a) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
 if aa↓ ∧ aa = ,
⊥ if aa↓ ∧ aa = ,
⊥ if ¬(aa↓).
Hence r1(a)↓ for all a and (r1(r1) =  ↔ r1(r1) = ), a contradiction.
This settles the ﬁrst assertion of our theorem.
For the proof of the second assertion, assume that there is an f with
∀x∀g(f(x, g)↓ ∧ f(x, g) = {y ∈ x : gy↓}).
Now consider the L◦ term t := x.f(x, y.yy) and observe that
∀x(tx↓ ∧ tx = {y ∈ x : yy↓}).
This reduces the second assertion to the ﬁrst, and the proof of our theorem
is completed. 
What about nonuniform separations with deﬁnedness and applications? Let
us deﬁne the Δ+0 formulas of L◦ to be the L◦ formulas without unbounded
quantiﬁers. So, in contrast to the Δ0 formulas of L◦, the Δ+0 formulas may
contain the deﬁnedness relation and application terms. Below we show that
OST plus nonuniform Δ+0 separation, i.e.,
∀a ∀b∃c(c = {z ∈ b : A[a, z]}) (Δ+0 -Sep)
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where A[u, v] is a Δ+0 formula of L◦, is consistent. To calibrate the exact
consistency strength of OST+(Δ+0 -Sep) we refer to a well-known extension
of Kripke–Platek set theory.
The theory KP is the standard system of Kripke–Platek set theory with
inﬁnity as presented, for example, in Barwise [1], Ja¨ger [13], or Rathjen [24].
It is formulated in the language L, and Σ1 separation is the schema
∀a ∀b∃c(c = {z ∈ b : ∃xA[a, x, z]}) (Σ1-Sep)
for A[u, v, w] ranging over all Δ0 formulas of L. As usual we write (V = L)
for the axiom of constructibility.
Theorem 3.10. The theoryOST+(Δ+0 -Sep) can be interpreted in the theory
KP+ (Σ1-Sep) + (V = L).
Proof. In Ja¨ger and Zumbrunnen [23] a natural translation is introduced
that maps an L◦ formula A to a formula A such that
OST  A =⇒ KP+ (V = L)  A.
The crucial point of this interpretation is a Σ1 formula App[u, v, w], for
application, taking care of the L◦ formula (uv = w). Based on that, it can
be easily shown that every Δ+0 formula A of L◦ translates into a formula A
of L that is Δ0 in Σ1. Since separation for this class of formulas is provable
in KP+ (Σ1-Sep) + (V = L) we have our result. 
For the converse direction we will now see that adding to OST the very
special instance
∀x∀f∃y(y = {z ∈ x : fz↓}) (DEF)
of (Δ+0 -Sep), testing only for deﬁnedness, is suﬃcient for establishing Σ1
separation.
Theorem 3.11. Every instance of (Σ1-Sep) is provable in OST+ (DEF).
Proof. Let A[u, v, w] be a Δ0 formula of L with at most the variables
u, v, w free and select a closed L◦ term tA according to Lemma 3.2.
Depending on this tA we now deﬁne
s := xz.C(y.tA(x, y, z)).
The axiom (S5) of OST about the choice operator C therefore yields for all
a and z that
∃xA[a, x, z] ↔ (s(a, z)↓ ∧ A[a, s(a, z), z]). (*)
Hence for any b our additional axiom (DEF) implies the existence of a set c
such that
c = {z ∈ b : s(a, z)↓}.
For the L◦ term r := xz.tA(x, s(x, z), z) and all a we can easily verify
that
r(a) : c → B.
Thus we are ready to make use of axiom (S3) about separation for deﬁnite
operations and obtain the set S(r(a), c) for which
z ∈ S(r(a), c) ↔ z ∈ c ∧ r(a, z) = ,
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consequently also
z ∈ S(r(a), c) ↔ z ∈ b ∧ s(a, z)↓ ∧ tA(a, s(a, z), z) = .
Due to the properties of tA and (*) this yields that
S(r(a), c) = {z ∈ b : ∃xA[a, x, z]}.
So we have shown separation for the Σ1 formula ∃xA[u, x, v] of L◦ and
arbitrary parameters a and b. 
Corollary 3.12. OST+ (Δ+0 -Sep) and KP+ (Σ1-Sep) are equiconsistent.
This corollary is immediate from Theorem 3.10 and Theorem 3.11 simply by
recalling that KP + (Σ1-Sep) + (V = L) is conservative over KP+ (Σ1-Sep)
for absolute formulas and since OST contains KP according to Feferman
[10, 11] and Ja¨ger [16].
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